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I .  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("IDHW") appeals the Honorable John 
T. Mitchell's decision for these three consolidated cases reversing an administrative Hearing 
Officer's and the Department Director's orders denying rcimbursement for North Idaho 
Behavioral Health ("NIBH"), the inpatient psychiatric care unit of Kootenai Medical Center 
("KMC"). Sitting in its judicial-review capacity under the Idaho Administrative Procedures 
Act (IDAPA), Idaho Code $3 67-5201-5292, the District Court found that (1) KMC has 
proper standing to pursue claims against IDHW, (2) that KMC was denied due process, and 
(3) that contrary to federal statutory and regulatory law, the regulations promulgated by the 
IDHW prevent aggieved beneficiaries or their providers from prevailing in a Department 
hearing. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All three cases arise from administrative hearings: Case No. 34881 involves patient 
Joshua M.; Case No. 34879 involves patient Teresa K.; and Case No. 34880 involves patient 
Jennifer G. 
1. Teresa R. 
Patient Teresa K., a 19-year old girl, was treated as an inpatient at NIBH from 
November 6, 2005 to December 14, 2005. In the days leading up to November 6, 2005, 
Teresa had been staying at a women's shelter. Her behavior at the shelter was such that it 
prompted the authorities there on November 6, 2005 to have the police come, place her on an 
"involuntary hold" and to transfer her to NIBH. (R. 34879, Exh. 5, p. 2, 72; See I.C. 5 66- 
326; R. 34879, Exh. 6, [Exh. B] pp.  6-7). 
During her initial evaluation at NIBH on November 6, 2005, Teresa was diagnosed 
with a "history o f  postlraumatic stress disorder," "possible bipolar disorder," "polysubstance 
abuse by history," and "severe borderline personality disorder." (R. 34879, Exh. 6 [Exh. B] 
pp. 6-7). By November 9,2005, Teresa had agreed to stay in the facility volun~arily. 
By November 15, 2005, Teresa was no longer agreeing to treatment, but was still 
deemed to be a danger to herself or others, so judicial commitment proceedings under Title 
66, Chapter 3, o f  the Idaho Code were initiated. On November 15, 2005, Designated 
Examiner Sonja Engler, LMSW, certified that Teresa was "mentally ill," "likely to injure 
himselfiherself or others due to grave disability," "gravely disabled," and unable to "provide 
informed consent to treatment." (R. 34879, Exh. 6 [Exh. B] pp. 165-168). On November 16, 
2005 designated examiner, William Miller, M.D. made the same certification (R. 34879, Exh. 
6 [Exh. B] pp. 169-171). Also on November 16, 2005 the Kootenai County Prosecuting 
Attorney's office filed an "Application for Involuntary Care," relative to Teresa pursuant to 
Chapter 3 ,  Title 66 o f  the Idaho Code. On November 19, 2005, a hearing was held on the 
application for involuntary care, and Teresa was committed to the custody o f  the IDHW. (R. 
34879, Exh. 5, p.  2 ,721. 
Although she was co~llmitted to the custody o f  IDHW, Teresa remained at NIBH after 
November 19, 2005. (See R. 34879, Exh. 5, p. 2, n.1). On December 12, 2005, the lDHW 
Region I Mental Health program manager issued a "Termination o f  Commitment." (R. 
34879, Exh. 6 [Exh. B] p. 153). On December 14,2005, Teresa was discharged from NIBH 
and entered a group home. (R. 34879, Exh. 6 [Exh. B] p. 767). NIBH applied to Idaho 
Medicaid for reimbursement for the entire length of the stay between November 6, 2005 and . 
December 14, 2005. Qualis Health, a third-party contracted by IDHW to make 
determinations regarding Medicaid eligibility of applicants, issued a "Retrospective Partial 
Certification Notice" on January 26, 2006, approving reimbursement for the period of 
November 6, 2005 through November 9, 2005, but denying payment of all other dates of 
service. In the words of that letter: 
Based on review of the clinical information submitted, our 
medical peer consultant has advised that your admission lo the 
hospital was medically necessary to stabilize and treat your 
condition. However, your condition appears to have stabilized 
and it appears that care could have been provided in a less acute 
setting as of the above date [ I  1/9/2005]. 
R. 34879, Exh. 6 [Exh. B] p. 777. 
On February 2, 2006, NIBH requested reconsideration of the January 26, 2006 
"Retrospective Partial Certification Notice". (R. 34879, Exh. 6 [Exh. B] p. 776. On February 
21,2006, Qualis Health issued an "Upheld Appeal Notice." In the words of that document: 
The decision after appeal is to uphold the original non- 
certification. This determination is based on the following: 
After review of the clinical information submitted, our 
psychiatric peer consultant has advised that your admission to 
the hospital was medically necessary to stabilize and treat your 
condition. However, your condition appears to have stabilized 
and care could have been provided in a less acute setting as of 
1 1/09/2005. 
R. 34879, Ex. 6 [Exh. B] p. 773. 
On March 10, 2006, NIBH appealed the dates of service denied. (R. 34879, Exh. 6 
[Exh. B] p. 772). While the appeal was pending, the IDHW determined it would pay, and did 
pay, via a fund apparently different from the Medicaid funds it also administers, for the dates 
of service during which Teresa was in the legal custody of the Department, but actually 
housed at NIBH, those dates of service being November 19, 2005 through December 12, 
2005. (See R. 34879, Exh. 6 [Exh. A]). 
On August 6, 2006, a hearing before Hearing Officer Susan Servick was held on 
NIBH's appeal of all remaining unpaid dates of service. (see generally, R. 34879, Exh. 1). 
Following that hearing, the Hearing's Officer issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Preliminary Order on August 27, 2006, rejecting NIBH's appeal entirely. (See R. 
34879, Exh. 5). 
On September 11, 2006, NIBH appealed the decision of the Hearing Officer to the 
Director of the IDHW. (R. 34879, Exh. 4). On Novernber 22, 2006, the Director issued his 
"Final Decision and Order" affirming in their entirety the decisions of Qualis Health and the 
Hearing Officer. (R. 34879, Exh. 2). On December 18, 2006, NIBH filed its Petition for 
Judicial Review. (R. Vol I, p. 001) 
Patient Jennifer G., a 14 year old girl, was treated by NIBH from December 23, 2005, 
through January 4, 2006. (R. 34880, Exh. 5, p. 3,74). Immediately prior to her December 23, 
2005 admission, Jennifer had been incarcerated, but was making suicidal statements in jail 
which prompted the Department of Corrections and IDHW to have her transferred to NIBH. 
(R. 34880, Exh 12 [Exh. C] p. 10). Upon admission on December 23,2005, in addition to the 
suicidal statements made while in jail, Jennifer's pertinent history was found to include self- 
injurious behavior for over one year, prior psychiatric assessment by the same facility, non- 
compliance with prior recommendation for outpatient treatment, and a family history of 
mental health disorders. Her diagnoses on admission included "major depressive disorder," 
"ruleout dysthymia," "rule-out oppositional defiant disorder," and "history of cannabis 
abuse." (R. 34880, Exh. 12 [Exh. C] pp. 12-13). Her diagnoses on discharge included 
"dysthyrnia," "oppositional defiant disorder," and "history of cannabis abuse." (R. 34880, 
Exh. 12 [Exh. C] p. 11). 
NIBH applied to Idaho Medicaid for reimbursement for the entire length of stay 
between December 23, 2005, and January 4, 2006. Thereafter Qualis Health issued a 
"Retrospective Partial Certification Notice" on May 17, 2006, approving reimbursement for 
the period of December 23, 2005 to December 28, 2005, but denying payment of the 
remaining dates of service. (R. 34880, Exh. 12 [Exh. B] p. 3). In the words of that letter: 
Based on review of the clinical information submitted, our 
medical peer consultant has advised that your admission to the 
hospital was medically necessary to stabilize and treat your 
condition. However, your condition appears to have stabilized 
and it appears that care could have been provided in a less acute 
setting as of the above date [12/28/2005]. 
R. 34880, Exh. 12 [Exh. B] p. 3. 
NIBH requested reconsideration of the May 17, 2006, "Partial Certification" and on 
May 25, 2006, Qualis Health issued an "Upheld Appeal Notice." In the words of that 
document: 
The decision after appeal is to uphold the original non- 
certification. This determination is based on the following: 
After review of the clinical information submitted, our 
psychiatric peer consultant has advised that your child's 
admission to the hospital was medically necessary to stabilize 
and treat her condition. However, her condition appears to have 
stabilized and care could have been provided in a less acute 
setting as of 12/28/2005. 
R. 34880, Exh. 12 [Exh. B] p. 1. 
On June 9,2006, NIBH appealed the dates of service denied. (R. 34880, Exh. 12 [Exh. 
A]). On November 30, 2006, a hearing before Hearing Officer Susan Servick was held on 
NIBH's appeal. (See generally R. 34880, Exh. 1).  On December 22, 2006, the Hearing 
Officer issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order, affirming in 
its entirety the decision by Qualis Health. (R. 34880, Exh. 5). On January 5, 2007, NIBH 
appealed the decision of the Hearing Officer to the Director of the IDHW. (R. 34880, Exh. 
4). On March 9, 2007, the Director issued his "Final Decision and Order" affirming in their 
entirety the decisions of Qualis Health and the Hearing Officer. (R. 34880, Exh. 2). On 
March 22, 2007, NIBH filed its Petition for Judicial Review. (R. Vol. I, p. 008) 
3. Joshua M. 
Patient Joshua M., a 16 year old boy, was admitted on August 20, 2005 for inpatient 
psychiatric care at NIBH. (R. 34881, Exh. 5, p. 5, 710). The day before his admission, the 
boy had attempted suicide by slitting his wrists. (R. 34881, Exh. 6 [Exh. 21 p. 1). He had 
several prior suicide attempts, a history of heavy substance abuse, a family history of suicide, 
suicide attempts, heavy substance abuse, and a currently chaotic and dysfunctional living 
situation. Id. The boy was evaluated and treated at NIB13 until August 31, 2005, at which 
time he was discharged. (R. 34881, Exh. 7 [Exh. B] p. 14). 
NIBH applied to Idaho Medicaid for reimbursement for the entire length of stay. 
Qualis Health issued a "Retrospective Partial Certification Notice" on March 6, 2006, 
approving reimbursement for the period of August 20, 2005 to August 25, 2005, but denying 
payment of the remaining dates of service. In the words of that letter: 
Based on review of the clinical information submitted, our 
medical peer consultant has advised that your admission to the 
hospital was medically necessary to stabilize and treat your 
condition. However, your condition appears to have stabilized 
and it appears that care could have been provided in a less acute 
setting as of the above date [8/25/05]. 
R. 34881, Exh. 7 [Exh. A] p. 3. 
NIBH requested reconsideration of the March 6, 2006 "Retrospective Partial 
Certification Notice," and on March 23, 2006, Qualis Health issued an "Upheld Appeal 
Notice." In the words of that document: 
The decision after appeal is to uphold the original non- 
certification. This determination is based on the following: 
After review of the clinical information submitted, our 
psychiatric peer consultant has advised that your child's 
admission to the hospital was medically necessary to stabilize 
and treat his condition. However, his condition appears to have 
stabilized and care could have been provided in a less acute 
setting as of 8/25/2005. 
R. 34881, Exh. 7, [Exh. A] p. 5. 
On April 20, 2006, NIBH appealed the dates of service denied. (R.  Exh. 7 [Exh. A] p. 
2). On August 14, 2006 an appeal hearing was held before Hearing Officer, Susan K. 
Servick. (See generally R. 34881, Exh. 1). On September 5,2006, the Hearing Officer issued 
her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order, affirming in its entirely the 
decision of Qualis Health. (R. 34881, Exh. 5) .  On September 19, 2006, NIBH appealed the 
decision of the Hearing Officer to the Director of the IDHW. (R. 34881, Exh. 4). On 
December 8, 2006, the Director issucd his "Final Decision and Order" affirming in their 
entirety the decisions of Qualis Health and the Hearing Officer. (R. 34881, Exh. 2). On 
January 5, 2007, KMC filed its petition for judicial review. (R. Vol. I, p. 005). 
On September 13, 2007, oral argument was presented to the District Court below, 
relative to all three of the above appeals. (See generally, Tr. 9113107 oral argument). 
On October 30, 2007, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order 
on Appeal, relative to all three appeals. (R. Vol. 11, pp. 259-273). 
On December 10, 2007, Appellant filed its notices of appeal of the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order on appeal in all three matters. (R. Vol. 11, pp. 274-289). 
On January 10, 2008, this Court issued its Order Consolidating Appeals - No. 
34879134880134881. (R. Vol II., pp. 292-293). 
11. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court was correct in finding that the Hearing Officer's 
Preliminary Orders were not supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
2. Whether the District Court was correct that KMC was denied its due process 
rights under 42 CPR $5 431.200, et seq. and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US 254. 
3. Whether the District Court was correct in striking the testimony of the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare's witness due to his lack of knowledge and familiarity with 
services in the area that were less intensive than outpatient care. 
4. Whether the District Court was correct in ruling that the Hearing Officer 
should consider testimony from the patients' treating physicians presented at the hearing. 
5. Whether the District Court was correct in ruling that KMC had standing to 
assert the rights of its patients. 
6. Whether the District Court was correct in finding that IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05, 
now 16.03.09.702.02, conflicts with 42 CFR 5 441.152 by requiring that providers present 
"documentation sufficient to demonstrate'' certain criteria has been satisfied to a contracted 
third-party so that the third-party may make a determination as to whether the criteria has 
been met, as opposed to the certification being done by the patients' team at the hospital. 
111. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests the court award it its attorney fees and costs on appeal, pursuant 
to Idaho Code $ 12-1 17(1) and IRCP 54(d); IRCP 54(e), and IAR 41. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of judicial review over an action taken by an administrative agency is 
established by Idaho Code $67-5279. An agency's decision must be affirmed unless the court 
finds that the action of the agency was: (a) a violation of constitutional or statutory 
provisions; (b) in excess of the agency's statutory authority; (c) is made upon unlawful 
procedure; (d) is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole; or (e) is 
arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. I.C. 5 67-5279(3). 
Additionally, "A strong presumption of validity favors an agency's actions." Young 
Electric Sign Co. v. State ex rel., Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 807 (2001). Moreover, the court 
"shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on 
questions of fact." I.C. 5 67-5279(1). A court instead must "defer to the agency's findings of 
fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous and unsupported by the evidence in the 
record." Young Electric Sign, 135 Idaho at 807. 
Moreover, a party seeking to set aside an agency's decision must first illustrate that the 
agency "erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code 5 67-5279(3), and then establish that a 
substantial right has been prejudiced." Barron v. Idaho Dep't of Water Resources, 135 Idaho 
414, 417 (2001). This Court is to determine the validity of the District Court's judgment with 
respect to the Department's Medicaid determinations by conducting an independent review of 
the administrative record in accordance with the standards described above. Employers Res. 
Mgmt. Co. v. Dep't o f  Ins., 143 Idaho 179, 182 (2006). All other issues concerning the 
District Court's judgments are questions of law subject to free review. Hall v. Farmers 
Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313 (2008). 
V. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
A. MEDICAID LAW GENERALLY 
"Medicaid" is a program that finds its origin in 42 USCS $ 1396 et. seq., otherwise 
known as XIX of the Social Security Act. Under that 1965 federal legislation, the states were 
given the option but were not required to participate in a system of public welfare activities to 
be administered by the states subject to meeting certain federally established requirements. 
See 79 Am. Jur. 2d Welfare Laws, § 33 el. seq. The program is financed jointly by state and 
primarily federal funds. Id. 
Congress specifically permitted state action under the Medicaid legislation, and as 
such, concepts of federal preemption found in other areas of federal legislation do not apply 
here, per se. However, because Congress did require participating states' Medicaid plans to 
conform to federal requirements, it is well-settled that where a state Medicaid law conflicts 
with a specific federal Medicaid law, the federal law will preempt the state law. See 79 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Welfare Laws, 5 35; Martin ex rel. Hoffvs. Cify ofRochester, 642 NW 2d 1 (Minn. 
2002). 
B. SUBSTANTIVE FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW 
Inaatient Psychiatric Hospital Services for Individuals Under Age 21 
The federal Medicaid statute addresses the precise sort of medical assistance at issue 
in these cases: 
(1) For purposes of paragraph (16) of subsection (a), the 
term 'inpatient psychiatric hospital services for individuals 
under age 21' includes only - 
(A) inpatient services which are provided in an institution 
(or distinct part thereof) which is a psychiatric hospital as 
defined in section 1861(f) [42 USCS 5 1395x(f)] or in another 
inpatient setting that the Secretary has specified in regulations; 
(B) inpatient services which, in the case of any individual (i) 
involve active treatment which meets such standards as may be 
prescribed in regulations by the Secretary, and (ii) a team, 
consisting of physicians and other personnel qualified to make 
determinations with respect to mental health conditions and the 
treatment thereof, has determined are necessary on an inpatient 
basis and can reasonably he expected to improve the condition, 
by reason of which said services are necessary, to the extent that 
eventually such services will no longer be necessary; and 
(C) inpatient services which, in the case of any individual, are 
provided prior to 
(i) the date such individual attains age 2 1, or 
(ii) in the case of an individual who was receiving such 
services in the period immediately preceding the date on 
which he attained age 21, (I) the date such individual no 
longer requires such services or (11) if earlier, the date 
such individual attains age 22; . . . 
42 USC 5 1396d(h)(l). 
Federal regulations promulgated pursuant to the above statute further define the 
criteria for inpatient psychiatric hospital services for individuals under age 21. 42 CFR 5 
441.1 5 1 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Inpatient psychiatric services for individuals under age 
21 must be: 
(1) Provided under the direction of a physician; 
(2) Provided by - 
(i) A psychiatric hospital or an inpatient psychiatric 
program in a hospital, accredited by the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Health Care 
Organizations; or 
(ii) A psychiatric facility that is not a hospital and is 
accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Health Care Organizations, the Commission on 
Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities, the Council on 
Accreditation of Services for Families and Children or 
by any other accrediting organization with comparable 
standards that is recognized by the State. 
(3) Provided before the individual reaches age 21, or, if the 
individual was receiving the services immediately before he or she 
reached age 2 1, before the earlier of the following - 
(i) the date the individual no longer requires the 
services; or 
(ii) the date the individual reaches 22; and 
(4) Certified in writing to be necessary in the setting in which 
the services will be provided (or are being provided in emergency 
circumstances) in accordance with 4 441.152. 
42 CFR § 441.152 provides: 
(a) A team specified in § 441.1 54 must certify that - 
( I )  Ambulatory care resources available in the community do 
not meet the treatment needs of the recipient; 
(2) Proper treatment of the recipient's psychiatric condition 
require services on an inpatient basis under the direction of a 
physician; and 
(3) The services can reasonably be expected to improve the 
recipient's condition or prevent further regression so that the 
services will no longer be needed. 
42 CFR $ 44 1.154 provides: 
Inpatient psychiatric services must involve "active treatment," 
which means implementation of a professionally developed and 
supervised individual plan of care, described in $ 441.155, that 
is - 
(a) Developed and implemented no later than 14 days after 
admission: and 
(b) Designed to achieve the recipient's discharge from inpatient 
status at the earliest possible time. 
C. SUBSTANTIVE IDAHO LAW 
Idaho's enabling "Medicaid" statute is found at I.C. $ 56-201 et. seq. The Idaho 
legislation is a model of brevity, providing that: 
Medical assistance shall be awarded to persons as mandated by 
federal law; and medical assistance may he awarded to such 
other persons not required to be awarded medical assistance as 
mandated by federal law when such award is to the fiscal 
advantage of the State of Idaho. 
LC. $ 56-209b(1). 
Beyond this rather general legislation, the details are left to the Director of the IDHW. 
Under I.C. $ 56-202, said Director is charged with the duty to "administer public assistance 
and social services to eligible people." "Public Assistance" is defined as including "medical 
assistance." LC. 8 56-201(e). "Medical Assistance" is, in turn, defined as meaning "payments 
for part or all of the cost of such care and services allowable within the scope of Title XIX of 
the Federal Social Security Act as amended as may be designated by Department rule." I.C. $ 
Substantive rules promulgated by the IDHW, pertaining to inpatient psychiatric 
services for individuals under age 21 are addressed, as pertinent, below. 
D. FEDERAL PROCEDURAL LAW 
42 USCS $ 1396a(a)(3) mandates that any participating state's Medicaid plan: 
Provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the 
State agency to any individual whose claim for medical 
assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted on with 
reasonable promptness. 
Federal regulations promulgated pursuant to 42 USCS $ 1396a(a)(3) hrther define 
what requirements a state plan must meet in order to meet the obligation of providing a "fair 
hearing." See 42 CFR $ 431.200 et. seq. Specifically, the "fair hearing" required by 42 USCS 
$ 1396a(a)(3), "must meet the due process standards set forth in Goldberg vs. Kelley, 397 US 
254, (1970), and any additional standards specified in this subpart." 42 CFR $ 431.205(d). 
Much of the Goldberg opinion is pertinent to this case, but the following excerpt addresses 
the heart of KMC's position on the due process aspect of this appeal: 
The city's procedures presently do not permit recipients to 
appear personally with or without counsel before the official 
who finally determines continued eligibility. Thus a recipient is 
not permitted to present evidence to that official orally, or to 
confiont or cross examine adverse witnesses. These omissions 
are fatal to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures. 
Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 US 254,25 L.Ed.2d 287,299 (1970). 
Elsewhere, the federal regulations make clear that the aggrieved party is entitled to a 
"de novo" appeal of an adverse determination of an application for medical assistance. See 42 
CFR $431.232 and 42 CFR $ 431.233. 
E. STATE PROCEDURAL LAW 
I.C. 5 56-216 provides: 
Appeal and Fair Hearing. -- An applicant or recipient 
aggrieved because of the state department's decision or delay in 
making a decision shall be entitled to appeal to the state 
department in the manner prescribed by it and shall be afforded 
reasonable notice and opportunity for a fair hearing by the state 
department. 
I.C. 5 56-216 is cited as one of the statutory authorities for the IDHW promulgated 
"Rules Governing Contested Case Proceedings and Declaratory Rulings," found at IDAPA 
16.05.03 et. seq. See IDAPA 16.05.03.000. 
Of particular significance to these cases is IDAPA 16.05.03.131, which states: 
AUTHORITY OF HEARING OFFICER. The hearing officer 
will consider only information that was available to the 
Department at the time the decision was made. If appellant 
shows that there is additional relevant information that was not 
presented to the Department with good cause, the hearing officer 
will remand the case to the Department for consideration. No 
hearing officer has the jurisdiction or authority to invalidate any 
federal or state statute, rule, regulation or court order. The 
hearing officer must defer to the Department's interpretation of 
statutes, rules, regulations or policy unless the hearing officer 
finds the interpretation to be contrary to statute or an abuse of 
discretion. The hearing officer will not retain jurisdiction on any 
matter after it has been remanded to the Department. 
Appeals from an adverse ruling by the Hearing Officer are to the board of the 
Department of Health and Welfare. IDAPA 16.05.03.151. Appeals from an adverse ruling 
by the board or its designee are to the District Court. IDAPA 16.05.03.152. 
The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare is an "agency" within the meaning of 
I.C. 5 67-5201(2), and as such, judicial review of the Department's actions is authorized under 
the Administrative Procedures Act. I.C. 5 67-5201 el. seq.; I.C. 5 67-5270. That said, as 
discussed above, Medicaid is a creature of federal law. 79 Am. Jur. 2d, Welfare Laws, 5 35. 
Accordingly, the federal substantive and procedural laws relative to Medicaid must be 
followed by Idaho's executive, legislative and judicial branches, if Idaho law, either 
substantively or procedurally, conflicts with the federal law. Id. 
F. DUE PROCESS 
1 .  Addressing The "Decision Maker" 
All three cases before this court involve "retrospective" reviews. IDHW has delegated 
to a company called Qualis Health the authority to decide whether to pay Medicaid claims. 
(R. 34881, Exh. 5, p. 2, 7 3; R. 34879, Exh. 5, p. 20; R. 34880, Exh. 5, p. 2, 7 2). Qualis 
Health performs this function by conducting "reviews." Reviews can be either "concurrent" 
or "retrospective." 
"Concurrent" reviews are done where a patient is already enrolled in Medicaid at the 
time of his or her hospitalization. The process is referenced in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.03 and 
.04. In essence, in a concurrent review, contact is made between the hospital and Qualis 
Health before admission, or in the case of an emergency, within a day of admission. 
Provision is made for consultation between the treating physician and the reviewing physician 
to discuss the particulars of the case, the need for admission and the length of stay. 
Admissions in concurrent reviews are approved in advance of the care being given. 
"Retrospective" reviews occur when the hospitalization in question is the catalyst for 
enrolling the patient in the Medicaid system. As was the case with all three patients in 
question here, enrollment is typically not completed until after the patient is discharged from 
the hospital. In such cases, there is no opportunity, either at admission, during the stay, or 
afterward, for the treating physician or anyone else to discuss the particulars of the given case 
with the decision maker(s) at Qualis. Rather, the hospital's communication to Qualis on the 
circumstances of a particular case is restricted to the contents of the patient's medical chart. 
(See,R.34880,Exh. l ,p.2,L.  16-p.3,L. 15). 
The treating physicians testified before the Hearing Officer on all three cases before 
this court. Relying on IDAPA 16.05.03.13 1, the Hearing Officer disregarded the treating 
physicians' testimonies on all three cases as "irrelevant." (R. 34881, Exh. 5, p. 21; R. 34880, 
Exh. 5, p. 23; R. 34879, Exh. 5, p. 19). 
To the extent Qualis Health is the "decision maker" on Medicaid claims, then its 
method of conducting retrospective reviews clearly violates the provisions of 42 CFR $ 
43 1.205(d) and the case of Goldberg vs. Kelley, 397 US 254 ( I  970). Federal law makes plain 
that the aggrieved party must be given the opportunity to appear personally before the official 
whose findings determine eligibility. 
To the extent that the Hearing Officer is the "decision maker," then IDAPA 
16.05.03.131, and the Hearing Officer's reliance on it to disregard the testimony of the 
treating physicians, also clearly violates 42 CFR $ 431.205(d), the case of Goldberg v. Kelley, 
supra, 42 CFR $ 431.232 and 42 CFR $ 431.233. Federal law makes plain that not only is the 
aggrieved party in a Medicaid case entitled to address the decision maker personally, but also 
is entitled to a de novo appeal of an adverse determination. 
The retrospective review process promulgated by IDHW and its contractor, in 
combination with IDAPA 16.05.03.131 as applied by the Hearing Officer and the Director in 
the successive appeals below, effectively ensures that no one may ever present and have 
considered a complete case, including both written and testimonial evidence. Such is not 
permitted under the controlling federal law, as Judge Mitchell correctly found. To the extent 
IDHW's appeals are based on argument to the contrary, the decision of Judge Mitchell should 
be affirmed. 
2.  Confronting Adverse Witnesses 
In all three cases before this court, the Department presented and the Hearing Officer 
accepted and relied upon, over the objection of KMC, evidence of the findings and opinions 
of certain "unnamed" psychiatrists working for Qualis Health. (R. 34880, Exh. 5, pp. 20-22; 
R. 34881, Exh. 5, p. 4 ,7  6; R. 34879, Exh. 5, p. 3, fi 3). Judge Mitchell correctly ordered such 
evidence "stricken" from the record. (R. Vol. 11, p. 270). 
Federal law clearly requires an opportunity to cross examine adverse witnesses. 42 
CFR $ 431.205(d); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 US 254 (1970). Where a Hearing Officer allows 
evidence from an adverse witness in defiance of controlling federal law, the only appropriate 
remedy is to redact that evidence from the record. 
On appeal, IDHW offers several arguments on the subject of the propriety of evidence 
from the "unnamed" witnesses. Some of those arguments are based on the notion that NIBH 
lacks standing to assert "due process" rights. Those arguments are addressed in a separate 
section, infra. The remaining arguments are (1) "hearsay is admissible in administrative 
hearings," and (2) "even beneficiaries are not entitled to obtain the identity of a QIO peer 
reviewer." (Appellant's Brief on Appeal, pp. 20-23). Each of those two arguments is 
misplaced. 
IDHW cites I.C. $ 67-5251(1) and IDAPA 16.05.03.134 for the proposition that 
hearsay is admissible in administrative hearings. That argument simply ignores the provision 
of federal law which defines a "fair hearing" as including the opportunity to "cross examine 
adverse witnesses." Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 US 254, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 299 (1970). The 
cause of IDHW is not advanced by reliance on state statutes and regulations preempted by 
federal law. This court should reject the argument set forth by IDHW. 
IDHW next argues that several federal regulations, taken in combination, prohibit 
disclosure of the identities of "peer reviewers" without the consent of such individuals. (See 
Appellant's Brief on Appeal, pp. 20-21). The resulting argument is misplaced. 
First, the right to cross examine adverse witnesses is express and unqualified. IDHW 
is free to call or not call any witnesses it sees fit in the context of a "fair hearing." Nothing 
requires the Department to offer evidence of either the identities or the opinions of unnamed 
"peer reviewers." It is one thing to conduct a review, and quite another to offer testimony at a 
"fair hearing." 
Construed together, the various federal regulations lead to only one result which does 
not render any of them a nullity. That result is that if the identity of the reviewer is to remain 
undisclosed, then the views of the reviewer may not be presented at the fair hearing. Such 
result protects the secrecy of the identity of the peer reviewer and also protects the right of the 
aggrieved party to cross examine adverse witnesses against it. 
Second, it is clear under the regulations cited by IDHW that the reviewers' identities 
can be disclosed if the reviewers so consent. 42 CFR § 480.133(a)(2)(iii). Apparently, 
lDHW andlor Qualis Health have elected to employ reviewers who either have not been asked 
to so consent or have refused to do so. That election does present challenges to IDHW in 
terms of presenting its case at "fair hearings," but the convenience of the Department does not 
trump the federal regulation requiring the right to "cross examine adverse witnesses." 
Unlike the provider in Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Arkansas Dept. of Ifurnan 
Services, 444 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 2006), KMC does not seek the identity of the unnamed 
reviewer, per se. Rather, KMC seeks simply to exercise the right to cross examine adverse 
witnesses. The Department may keep, and indeed has kept, those identities secret. Being not 
available for cross examination, however, those witnesses may not be offered for evidence 
against KMC. Judge Mitchell ruled correctly and should be affirmed in this regard. 
G. STANDING 
The Department argues at several places in its brief that NIBH essentially lacks 
standing in this case. Such is seen (1) under the heading "Goldberg does not afford the same 
protections to providers as it does to beneficiaries" on page 19, (2) under the heading "A 
provider's cross-examination of a QIO peer reviewer is not a substantial right" on page 23, 
and (3) under the heading "Third Party Standing Is Irrelevant And Unsupported In These 
Cases" on page 29. The common theme to all of these arguments is the notion that the "fair 
hearing" rights set forth in the federal authorities inure to the benefit of patients and not 
providers. 
IDHW relies on Geriatrics, Inc. v. Harris, 640 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1981), and 
Erickson v. United States ex rel. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 67 F.3d 858, 862 (9th 
Cir. 1995), in support of its "standing" argument(s). (See Appellant's Brief on Appeal, pp. 24- 
26). That reliance is misplaced. 
Geriatrics, Inc. involved a nursing home facing non-renewal of its "operating license," 
"Medicaid Certification," and "Medicaid Provider Agreement." 640 F.2d at 263. Plaintiffs 
included (1) the nursing home itself, and (2) the patients of the nursing home. 
With respect to the claims of the patients, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
they had a right to notice and hearing before the right to government payment of certain 
medical services can be withdrawn, and that the decision to decertify a nursing home does not 
deprive of those direct rights, and therefore does not affect their constitutional rights. 640 
F.2d at 264. The present case does not concern "decertification" of a provider, but instead 
involves payment of medical services. As such, Geriatrics, lnc. stands for the proposition 
that the patients involved in this case have due process rights subject to protection. 
With respect to the claims of the nursing home itself, the issue in Geriatrics, Inc. was 
not whether a nursing home was entitled to a "full administrative review," but whether that 
review had to occur before or after non-renewal of certification. Id. The Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals ultimately found that a pre-termination hearing was not required, but in doing so, 
it specifically recognized the nursing home's federal regulatory right to a fair hearing, albeit 
after the fact. 640 F.2d at 264-265. 
Geriatrics, Inc. did not address the standing of a certified provider to assert due 
process rights when pursuing a claim for services rendered. The case concerns itself with the 
due process rights of the provider relative to certifi cation, itself. The Court's discussion of 
due process rights relative to the latter cannot be said to apply to the former, as the former was 
not the issue there, and indeed, it is nonsensical to assume that discussion about the timinn of 
a due process hearing would have any application to a case where one party asserts the other 
has no due process rights whatsoever, irrespective of timing. Geriatrics, Inc. simply does not 
address the issue before this Court, nor does it support the position of the Department here. 
The Department's reliance on Erickson v. United States ex rel. Dept. of Health and 
Ifuuman Services, 67 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 1995), is similarly misplaced. As was the case in 
Geriatrics, Inc., the issue in fiickron did not concern a certified provider's due process rights 
relative to a claim for services rendered, but, rather, concerned the due process rights of a 
provider relative to certification itself. 67 F.3d at 860-862. 
In Erichon, the physician in question had been tried criminally and convicted of 
Medicare fraud. 67 F.3d at 860. A lower court had enjoined the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services from excluding the physician from federally funded health care programs 
until such time as the physician had exftausted his appeals of the criminal conviction. Id. 
According to the lower court, the injunction was necessary to protect the physician's due 
process rights. Id. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed whether the physician had 
either a property interest or a liberty interest in continued certification, it being necessary that 
he possess at least one of those interests to support a due process right. 67 F.3d at 862. 
First, the Nine Circuit Court of Appeals held that the physician did not "possess a 
property interest in continued participation in Medicare, Medicaid, or the federal funded state 
health care programs." Id. Importantly, and cited by the Court as authority for that holding 
was the case of Cervoni v. Secrelary of Health, Education and Welfare, 58 1 F.2d 101 0 ( I  st 
Cir. 1978). Id. At issue in Cervoni was whether a physician working out of a hospital was 
entitled to be compensated under "Medicare Part B" (which paid 100% of its charges without 
discounts) or "Medicare Part A" (which paid at a discounted rate). 581 F.2d at 1012-1013. 
The Cervoni Court held that the physician did not have a protectable property interest in his 
classification. 581 F.2d at 1018-1019. However, the Cervoni court went on to hold: 
This general determination of the proper classification of 
services does not affect specific bills which Dr. Cervoni may 
submit for payment. If in the future Dr. Cervoni makes a claim 
for payment under Part B, as found by the District Court, 
'should said claim be denied or not acted on expeditiously, 
plaintiff would have a right to the review proceedings 
established in 20 CFR 405.801 et seq. The same would hold 
true with respect to a disagreement over the amount of 
payment.' (App.233). Since Dr. Cervoni possessed no 
protectable property interest, the Secretary was not required to 
give him a hearing before making the classification. 
581 F.2d at 1019 (emphasis added). 
As was the case with Geriatrics, Inc., supra., the holding in Cervoni, was not, as the 
Department argues here, that the provider was not entitled to due process on claims for 
reimbursement. Rather, both cases clearly hold that the opposite is true. 
Returning to the Erichon case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' discussion of the 
physician's "liberty interest" is also of importance here. Citing Vanelli v. Reynolds School 
Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1982), the Erickson Court held the physician had a 
protectable liberty interest in his continued certification because losing it would constitute 
"alteration of some right or status recognized by [law]." 67 F.3d at 863. Having so found, 
the Court went on to find that the criminal trial which resulted in the physician's conviction 
afforded him "adequate due process." Id. 
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the Ninth Circuit (per Erichon) recognizes 
that providers are entitled to due process protection relative to their certification status to 
participate in federally funded health care programs, but the Tenth Circuit (per Geriatrics, 
Inc.) apparently does not. Both Circuits, however, recognize the distinction between due 
process rights relative to status and due process rights relative to claims for payment for 
services rendered. In short, neither Erichon nor Geriatrics, Inc. support the argument made 
by the Department in this case, namely, that KMC is not entitled to due process on its claims 
for payment of services rendered. 
Not mentioned by name in IDHW's brief in this case is the case of Singleton v. Wul$ 
428 US 106, 49 L.Ed.2d 826, 96 S.Ct. 2868 (1977), which is, indeed, "dispositive" of the 
Department's standing argurnent(s). (See Appellant's Brief on Appeal, p. 29). 
The plaintiffs in Singleton were Missouri licensed physicians who brought suit in 
federal court challenging the federal constitutionality of a Missouri statute excluding 
abortions which were hot medically indicated from the purposes for which a needy person 
may obtain Medicaid benefits. 49 L.Ed.2d at 829-830. The defendant was a representative of 
the Missouri Department of Public Health and Welfare, responsible for issuing payments to 
providers under Missouri's Medicaid plan. 49 L.Ed.2 at 830, n. 4. 
The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on several grounds, including 
that the plaintiffs lacked "standing to litigate the constitutional issues raised." 49 L.Ed.2d at 
83 1. The court assigned to the case dismissed it "for lack of standing." Id. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, finding, albeit not very 
clearly, that the physicians had standing to pursue the case in their own right, as well as on 
behalf of their patients. 49 L.Ed.2d at 831-832. The issue addressed substantively by the 
Supreme Court on the subsequent appeal was the standing of the physicians to litigate the 
rights of their patients. 49 L.Ed.2d at 835 et seq. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the physicians did have standing to assert the rights of 
the patients. 49 L.Ed.2d at 835. In doing so, the Court utilized a two part test, examining (1) 
the relationship between the litigant and the nonparty and the resulting adequacy of 
representation of the rights of the latter by the former, and (2) obstacles in the way of the 
nonparty freely, fully and adequately litigating her own rights. 49 L.Ed.2d at 834-836. 
As to the first element, the Court noted that the issue there was the provision of 
healthcare, which necessarily involves the physician as well as the patient, and therefore "the 
enjoyment of the right is inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue, 
[so] the Court can be sure that its construction of the right is not unnecessary in the sense that 
the right's enjoyment will be unaffected by the outcome of the suit." 49 L.Ed.2d at 833. 
As to the second element, the Supreme Court noted as obstacles (1 )  the woman's 
concerns of privacy, (2) the specter of "imminent mootness" attendant to the pregnancy, (3) 
the inability to safely obtain an abortion without the assistance of a physician, and (4) the fact 
that an "impecunious woman" cannot easily obtain an abortion without the physician being 
paid by the State. 49 L.Ed.2d at 835. 
The Supreme Court specifically noted that these particular obstacles were not 
theoretically insurmountable, but held, nevertheless, that "there seems little loss in terms of 
effective advocacy from allowing its assertion by a physician." Id. 
Both Singleton and the present case involve the failure of state agencies responsible 
for administrating Medicaid plans to pay for medical care. In both cases, the practice of 
medicine necessarily involved both patient and healthcare provider, so the first element of the 
Singleton test is met here as there. 
The second element of the Singleton test is also met here. The "obstacle" of privacy 
concerns attendant to the stigma of mental health issues is arguably at least on par with that 
attendant to abortions. Mental healthcare, like abortions, requires the assistance of qualified 
healthcare providers, and it is not easily available to people with limited means, such as 
people qualifying for Medicaid assistance. And while it is true that impaired mental health 
does not necessarily cany with it the specter of "imminent mootness," the patient in Singleton 
did not suffer the obstacles of mental illness or minority, both of which exist in this case. In 
short, KMC has standing to pursue not only its own right to Medicaid reimbursement but also 
to pursue its patients' rights to have their Medicaid expenses paid by Medicaid.' 
The more recent case applying the Singleton analysis is Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. 
v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 293 F.3d 472 (8th Cir. 2002). Pediatric was a 
suit regarding funding cuts to early intervention services. The Court held, and the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed, that the plaintiffs, a group comprised of healthcare providers and recipient 
beneficiaries, had an enforceable right to the services in question. Relevant to the case at 
hand was the Arkansas Department of Human Services' argument that the provider plaintiffs 
had no standing because they are not the intended beneficiaries listed in the Medicaid statute 
in question.2 The Circuit Court rejected this argument, holding that even if the providers did 
not have individual standing, they still had standing to assert the rights of their patients. 293 
F.3d at 478. 
Pennsylvania Psychiatric v. Green Spring HLT, 280 F.3d 278 (3rd Cir. 2002) concerns 
the same third party standing issues addressed above, but adds the additional complication of 
an organization attempting to assert the third party rights its member doctors have in relation 
to their patients. The District Court dismissed the claim for lack of associational standing, but 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded holding that because the 
physicians, under Singleton, could assert the rights of their patients, and because the 
1 See also Perce v. Society ofsisters, 268 US 510, 69 L.Ed.2d 1070, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925) 
(private schools permitted to assert the rights of parents as against state requirements that their 
children receive a public education). 
2 42 USC 5 1396(a)(13). 
membership society had standing to assert the rights of its members, the society had standing 
vis-a-vis this chain of  connection^.^ 
The essence of the complaint in Pennsylvania Psychiatric was that the managed 
healthcare organizations impaired the quality of healthcare by psychiatrists to their patients by 
refusing to authorize necessary treatment, excessively burdening the reimbursement process, 
and impeding other vital care. Regarding the first element of the Singleton test, the Court 
held that: 
Psychiatrists clearly have the kind of relationship with their 
patients which lends itself to advancing claims on their behalf. 
This intimate relationship and the resulting mental health 
treatment ensures psychiatrists can effectively assert their 
patients' rights. Because the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society 
alleges the [HMOs] prevent patients from receiving necessary 
mental health services and psychiatrists from providing them, 
its member psychiatrists would be well suited to litigate these 
claims for both parties, as their interests are clearly aligned. See 
Amoto v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742 (noting doctor-patient 
3 "Our holding that the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society has alleged facts sufficient to 
establish the third party standing of its members to bring their patients' claims implies the 
satisfaction of only the first requirement of the Hunt test -- that 'its members would otherwise 
have standing' to bring these claims. A third-party claim must also meet the requirements that 
'the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose and that 'neither the 
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the 
lawsuit." Pennsylvania Psychiatric at 292. "It is a well-recognized anomaly of 
representational standing that the individuals who have sustained the requisite injury to satisfy 
the constitutional and prudential standing criteria are not in fact responsible for bringing suit. 
So long as the association's members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing 
and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then 
associations can advance the third-party claims of their members without suffering injuries 
themselves. If on remand the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society warrants associational 
standing to represent its members, we conclude it also may have derivative authority to raise 
the claims of its members' patients." Pennsylvania Psychiatric Socie6y at 293 [internal 
citations omitted]. 
relationship provides strong likelihood of effective advocacy by 
a physician of his patients). Accordingly, we believe the 
psychiatrist-patient relationship would satisfy the second 
criterion for third party standing. 
As to the second element of the Singleton test, the District Court found that the 
patients were not significantly hindered from suing. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
explicitly disagreed. First, the Circuit Court held that this "criterion does not require an 
absolute bar from suit, but 'hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own 
interests."' Pennsylvania Psychiatric at 290, quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 US 400. 
Referencing the discussion of privacy in Singleton, the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Court 
explained that the privacy concerns of mental health patients, and their fear of potential 
stigma, are sufficient to warrant their doctor asserting their rights on their behalf. 280 F.3d at 
290. "Besides the stigmatization that may blunt mental health patients' incentive to pursue 
litigation, their impaired condition may prevent them from being able to assert their claims. 
Therefore, we believe the patients' fear of stigmatization, coupled with the potential 
incapacity to pursue legal remedies, operates as a powerful deterrent to bringing suit." Id. 
Of further note is that the rights asserted do not have to be constitutional rights. The 
defendant HMOs argued that the third party claims asserted in Pennsylvania Psychiatric did 
not implicate the constitutional rights of the patients and that the granting of standing was 
unwarranted. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument holding, although generally 
speaking, successful third party claims have involved constitutional rights, but that has never 
been a necessity and is not part of the elements the Courts use to determine whether third 
party standing exists. Thus, the assertion of a constitutional right is not a prerequisite to a 
third party standing claim. Id at 291. 
In summary, the above authorities reveal that the Department in this case cannot avoid 
the federal constitutional, statutory and regulatory requiremehts of due process simply 
because the party pursuing this action is the healthcare provider rather than the patient. 
Furthermore, beyond insisting that KMC is not entitled to due process, the Department has 
offered very little in defense of the charge that its rules, processes and procedures are in direct 
violation of the relevant federal law. Judge Mitchell ruled correctly on this issue, and his 
decision should be affirmed. 
H. "DOCUMENTATION SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE" 
42 CFR 441.152 requires a patient's treatment team to "certify" that the patient's 
condition meets certain criteria in a given case. IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05, however, requires 
"documentation sufficient to demonstrate" those same criteria are met. 
Judge Mitchell correctly observed: 
This is a fundamental shift, as it takes away from the provider 
being able to certify certain criteria are in place, to the 
reviewing physician now being able to determine when, if ever 
[the] treatment [team] has provided 'documentation sufficient to 
demonstrate' similar criteria are in place. 
It seems obvious that the federal requirement that certain criteria be met relative to the 
patient's condition is a fundamentally different thing than the Idaho regulation purporting to 
require documentation of some sort, sufficient (in the eyes of the reviewer) to demonstrate 
that those criteria are met. The federal rule requires simply that the provider confirm that the 
criteria are met. The Idaho rule requires the provider in retrospective review cases to do much 
more: to persuade a skeptical reviewer in a strictly written format that such was the case. The 
Idaho rule conflicts with the federal rule and is therefore of no force and effect. 
The federal rules require that certain criteria be met relative to the patient's condition. 
If an application for payment is denied, the federal rules require a "fair hearing" on whether 
those criteria were met in the case of that patient. The fair hearing process, under the federal 
rules, allows the aggrieved party to directly address the decision maker and the reviewing 
authority and to present written and verbal evidence and to confront and cross examine 
adverse witnesses. Ail of this process is directed at the issue of whether the federai criteria 
for Medicaid payment are met. 
In Idaho, under the extant rules, things are markedly different. The focus at the "fair 
hearing" level is not whether the criteria relative to the patient's condition are met, but 
whether the patient's medical chart, standing alone, can withstand all assaults of the reviewer. 
The Hearing Officer's decision in each of these cases is demonstrative. 
In the case of Joshua M., the Hearing Officer concluded: 
3. There is no serious factual dispute between the parties 
regarding Joshua's medical condition at the time of his 
admission and stay at NIBH. The only issue is whether the 
medical chart sufficiently documented the medical necessity of 
inpatient psychiatric hospital care. 
5. The standard of proof in an administrative appeal such as 
this is the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard. Northern 
Frontiers v. State ex rel. Cade, 129 Idaho 437, 926 P.2d 213 
(Ct. App. 1996). Here, the petitioner has not carried the burden 
of proof assigned to it in this administrative proceeding to 
establish, by the preponderance of the evidence standard, 
the medical chart sufficiently documented the medical necessity 
of in-patient psychiatric hospital care. as defined by IDAPA 
&. 
R. 34881, Exh. 5 ,  p. 25, Mi 3 and 5 (italics original, underlining added). 
In the case of Teresa K., the Hearing Officer concluded: 
3. There is no serious factual dispute between the parties 
regarding Teresa's medical condition at the time of his [sic] 
admission and stay at NIBH. The only issue is whether the 
medical chart sufficiently documented the medical necessity of 
inpatient psychiatric hospital care. 
5. The standard of proof in an administrative appeal such as 
this is the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard. Northern 
Frontiers v. State ex rel. Cade, 129 Idaho 437, 926 P.2d 213 
(Ct. App. 1996). Here the petitioner has not carried the burden 
of proof assigned to it in this administrative proceeding to 
establish, by the preponderance of the evidence standard, 
the medical chart sufficientlv documented the medical necessity 
of in-patient psvchiatric care, as defined by IDAPA rules. 
R. 34879, Exh. 5 ,  p. 21, Mi 3 and 5 (italics original, underlining added). 
In the case of Jennifer G., the Hearing Officer concluded: 
3. There is no serious factual dispute between the parties 
regarding Jennifer's medical condition at the time of her 
admission and stay at NIBH. The only issue is whether the 
medical chart sufficiently documented the medical necessity of 
inpatient psychiatric hospital care. 
5. The standard of proof in an administrative appeal such as this 
is the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard. Northern 
Frontiers v. State ex rel. Cade, 129 Idaho 437,926 P.2d 213 (Ct. 
App. 1996). Here the petitioner has not canied the burden of 
proof assigned to it in this administrative proceeding to establish, 
by the preponderance of the evidence standard, that the medical 
chart sufficiently documented the medical necessity of inpatient 
psychiatric care, as defined by IDAPA rules. 
R. 34880, Exh. 5, p. 27,73 - p. 28,75 (italics original, underlining added). 
In all three cases, it is clear from the Hearing Officer's ruling that the patients met the 
requisite criteria for payment of their claims. It is also clear that the Hearing Officer ignored 
the controlling federal rules in favor of the Idaho rule purporting to restrict inquiry strictly to 
the patient's medical chart. Such was the basis of the Hearing Officer's affirmance of the 
actions of IDHW in all three cases before this court. However, as discussed in preceding 
sections, federal law preempts Idaho law on the subject of what criteria must be met to qualify 
for payment of a Medicaid claim. The holding of the Hearing Officer, as well as that of the 
Director of the Department, was clear error, and Judge Mitchell was correct to so hold. 
I. IDHW IS CONFINED TO THE STATED BASES FOR DENIAL IN THESE 
CASES 
As noted above. the stated basis for "non-certification" in all three of these cases 
before the court was that "care could have been provided in a less acute setting as of the above 
date. . . ." (R. 34881, Exh. 7, [Exh. A] p. 3; R. 34879, Exh. 6 [Exh. BJ p. 777; R. 34880, Exh. 
12 [Exh. B] p. 3). 
Under I.C. 5 67-5242: 
(1) In a contested case, all parties shall receive notice that shall 
include: 
. . . ( c )  a short and plain statement of the matters 
asserted or the issues involved. 
In all three cases before this court, the sole basis for denial, and the sole issue 
therefore properly before the Hearing Officer, is the assertion that care could have been 
provided in a less acute setting t h k  the hospital in all three cases. As discussed above, Judge 
Mitchell properly ordered stricken the "evidence" from the unnamed peer reviewers. That 
left, in all three cases, the testimony of Dr. Robert Lehman in support of IDHW on the subject 
at hand. In all three cases, Dr. Lehman admitted that he had no knowledge of any allegedly 
less restrictive treatment settings. (R 34880, Exh. 1, p. 82, L. 21 - p. 86, L. 3; R. 34881, Exh. 
1, p. 110, Ls. 1-17; R. 34879, Exh. I, p. 85, Ls. 6-8). 
In all three cases, the patient's treating physicians testified that their patient met the 
medical criteria for hospitalization for the entirety of their respective hospital stays. (R. 
34881, Exh. 5, p. 21, R. 34879, Exh. 5, pp. 18-19; R. 34880, Exh. 1, p. 26, Ls. 8-23; R. 
34880, Exh. 5, p. 23). 
In all three cases, the stated basis for denial was utterly unsupported by the evidence, 
and flatly refuted by the witnesses for NIBH. Judge Mitchell's ruling on that point is correct 
and should be affirmed. 
J. MISCELLANY 
As discussed above, the "documentation sufficient to demonstrate" rule from the Idaho 
regulation contradicts the controlling federal rule, and as such is of no IegaI force. That said, 
in order to demonstrate the arbitrariness and capriciousness to which the Idaho rule has led, 
the following are offered as illustration: 
1. Joshua M. 
Under IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.b.iii, a child requesting inpatient psychiatric services 
"must not be eligible for independent passes or unit passes without observation or being 
accompanied by hospital personnel or a responsible other." 
This patient was allowed to go on a brief, supervised, pass during the course of his 
stay. The reviewer in this case, Dr. Lehman, opined that even though the regulation 
disqualified patients allowed unsupervised passes, documentation of a supervised pass is 
evidence that the boy did not meet criteria: 
... if a patient is ready to go on pass that, or they're trusted to go 
on pass, that they probably don't need 24-hour nursing 
supervision at that point. 
R. 34881, Exh. I ,  p. 96, Ls. 10-12. 
Even though the State regulation authorized supervised passes, the Department's 
reviewer, under the notion of reviewing the record for "documentation sufficient to 
demonstrate," found that even supervised passes warrant denial. That finding, and the rule 
purporting to give the reviewer such liberty, is arbitrary and capricious. 
2. Jennifer G. 
This patient was admitted because she was making suicidal comments while in jail. 
According to the reviewer, she met the medical necessity requirements of IDAPA 
16.03.09.079.01.a.i(4) upon admission by virtue of those comments. (R. 34880, Exh. I, p. 68, 
L. 18-p.69, L. 4). 
Payment was denied for dates of service after December 28,2005. (R. 34880, Exh. 12 
[Exh. B] p. 3). However, on December 3 1,2005, accordtng to the medical records, the patient 
admitted to having new thoughts of harming herself and wm "vague" about "contracting for 
safety." (R. 34880, Exh. 12 [Exh. C] p. 91). The reviewer, again Dr. Lehman, testified that 
thoughts of self-harm and contracting for safety are separate and distinct concepts. (R. 34880, 
Exh. 1, p. 76, L. 18 - p. 77, L. 1). When a patient indicates she is planning to harm herself, 
mental health professionals then seek to gain agreement from the patient not to do so. 
Agreelng not to hurt oneself notwithstanding a desire to do so is "contracting for safety." 
Refusal to so agree is the other end of the spectrum. Being "vague" in response to the 
professional's efforts to gain such agreement is somewhere in between. Id. 
The record also reflects that at 8:49 a.m. on January 1, 2006, the patient denied 
thoughts of self harm, but by 3:23 p.m. she was again wanting to harm herself. (R. 34880, 
Exh. 12 [Exh. C] pp. 91-92). 
The record also reflects that while she was still in the hospital, her doctors requested 
psychoiogical testing. The psychologist's report was issued January 1, 2006 and states "[the 
patient] is at serious risk of self harm." (R. 34880, Exh. 12 [Exh. C] p. 26). 
In sum, the record reflects that the criteria of IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.a.i(4) were met 
during the "disapproved" dates of service. There was "documentation sufficient to 
demonstrate" that the same condition which won approval for the initial dates of service was 
still in existence well into the "disapproved" dates of service. The denial was arbitrary and 
capricious, even under the "documentation sufficient to demonstrate" rule. 
3. Teresa IC 
The patient in this case was hospitalized from November 6, 2005 to December 14, 
2005. Qualis Health approved reimbursement for the dates of November 6, 2005 through 
November 9, 2005, but denied payment of all other dates of services. (R. 34879, Exh. 6 [Exh. 
B] p. 773). 
Between November 6, 2005 and November 15, 2005, Teresa was in the hospital 
"voluntarily." By November 15,2005, however, she was no longer agreeing to treatment, but 
because she was deemed to be a danger to herself or others, judicial commitment proceedings 
under Title 66, Chapter 3 of the Idaho Code were initiated. On November 19,2005, the Court 
committed Teresa to the custody of the Department of Health and Welfare pursuant to 
Chapter 3, Title 66 of the Idaho Code. (R. 34879, Exh. 6 [Exh. B] pp. 165-168; R. 34879, 
Exh. 5, p. 2, y2). 
The medical record reviewed by Qualis Health included documentation of the judicial 
commitment proceedings, though the reviewer was unaware and did not familiarize himself 
with the psychiatric requirements for judicial commitment. (R. 34879, Exh.1, p. 68, L. 6 - p. 
70, L. 4). Also the medical record reviewed by Qualis Health included a November 9, 2005 
nurse's note indicating that Teresa was "responding to internal stimuli." (See Respondent's 
Motion to Augment, Exh. A). The reviewer was aware that this note documented that Teresa 
was either hearing voices in her head or having visual hallucinations at the time. (R. 34879, 
Exh. 1, p. 73, L. 4 - p. 74, L. 6). 
Likewise, on November 10, 2005, nurses' notes indicate that Teresa denied hearing 
imaginary voices, but clinical observation indicated that she was hearing them. (See 
Respondent's Motion to Augment, Exh. A). The reviewer reluctantly acknowledged that this 
note was another example of documentation of the grave disability requiring inpatient hospital 
care for Teresa. (R. 34879, Exh. I, p. 74, L. 7 - p. 75, L. 9). 
Again, on November 12, 2005 there was yet another nurse's note indicating clinical 
observation of indications of Teresa's hallucinations. (See Respondent's Motion to Augment, 
Exh. B). Yet again, the reviewer acknowledged that this note was another example of 
documentation of the grave disability requiring inpatient hospitalization for care of Teresa at 
the time. (R. 34879, Exh. I, p. 75, L. 12 - p. 76, L. 9). 
The medical record provided to Qualis Health also contained a November 13, 2005 
nurse's note reflecting that Teresa was still having hallucinations, and on top of that, was 
refusing her medications. (See Respondent's Motion to Augment, Exh. C). The reviewer 
acknowledged that this note was yet another example of documentation of Teresa's grave 
disability requiring inpatient hospital care at the time. (R. 34879, Exh. 1, p. 76, Ls. 10-22). 
Again, on November 17, 2005, there was in the chart provided to Qualis Health 
another nurse's note indicating that Teresa was having auditory hallucinations. (See 
Respondent's Motion to Augment, Exh. D). The reviewer acknowledged that this note was 
yet another example of documentation of the severity in nature of Teresa's condition requiring 
inpatient hospitalization. (R. 34879, Exh. 1, p. 77, Ls. 6-19). 
The case of Teresa K. is particularly egregious. It is apparent that the Department and 
its contractor have little regard for the actual contents of a patient's medical record, let alone 
the patient's actual psychological condition, when evaluating a claim for reimbursement. 
The utter disregard by the Department and its contractor of the above referenced facts 
are perhaps the best example in this case of Judge Mitchell's observation that "the IDAPA 
procedure lays the groundwork for arbitrary decision making." (R. Vol. 11, p. 271). 
The Department argues on page 30 of its Appellant's Brief on Appeal that it has 
elected to employ reviewers remote from the hospital premises, and as such, the 
"documentation sufficient to demonstrate" rule which it has promulgated represents the only 
way it and its reviewers can perform their hnctions required by federal law. One might 
question the extent to which the convenience of the Department, its agents and employees has 
any bearing on the issue at hand. One might also point out that the "documentation sufficient 
to demonstrate" rule is, in practice, as demonstrated by the facts of these cases, really a rule 
requiring documentation sufficient to satisfy a reviewer who simply cannot be satisfied. The 
Idaho rule is not only susceptible to capricious and arbitrary abuse, it has been so abused. 
We need not, however, engage in a debate as to the advisability of the Idaho rule. As 
demonstrated above, the federal rule requires inquiry into the condition of the patient, and is 
expressly not confined to the written chart of the patient when conducting that inquiry. Judge 
Mitchell ruled correctly on this point, and he should be affirmed in that respect. 
K. OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF THIS CLAIM IS INAPPROPRIATE 
42 CFR $ 447.253(b)(I)(ii)(B) provides that: 
If a State elects in its State plan to cover inappropriate level of 
care services (that is, services fiirnished to hospital inpatients 
who require a lower covered level of care such as skilled 
nursing or intermediate care services) . . . the methods and 
standards used to determine payment rates must specify that the 
payments for this type of care must be made at rates lower than 
those for inpatient hospital level care services, reflecting the 
level of care actually received. . . . 
IDAPA 16.03.09.400(17) provides that "inappropriate level of care" days are to be 
included in the calculation for reimbursement to a provider. 
As noted above, the stated basis for denial in all three cases is that the patients should 
have been treated at a less restrictive facility than KMC. The Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center v. Cook, 109 F.3d 693 (I lth Cir. 
1997), addressed essentially this same issue. In Cook, the plaintiffs were hospitals which 
provided inpatient psychiatric care for adults and adolescents under Florida's Medicaid 
program. The defendant, Mr. Cook, was the director of Florida's Medicaid program. At issue 
was reimbursement for "services at an inappropriate level of care." Essentially: 
. . . because of flaws in the state plan which result in the 
unavailability of alternative setting care for adolescent 
psychiatric patients upon discharge from the hospital, the 
hospitals are required to retain such patients within their 
facilities beyond the point of medical necessity. The State then 
disallows any reimbursement for the "grace days" between the 
time medical necessity ends and the day that discharge to an 
alternative setting is possible, because there is no medical 
necessity for in-patient services during this waiting period. 
Thus, under the guisc of disallowing compensation for lack of 
medical necessity, the State effectively shifts the fiscal impact 
of its flawed Medicaid program to the hospitals. . . . 
109 F.3d at 696. 
Here, if the Department's initial justification for denial of these claims is to be 
accepted, then it necessarily follows that KMC is being denied "inappropriate level of care" 
reimbursement because the Department has essentially decided the reimbursement rate for 
"inappropriate level of care" is zero dollars. The Cook Court, looking at 42 CFR 5 447.253 
and the (now repealed) Boren Amendment held that the reimbursement must be 
commensurate with the level of care received. 103 F.3d at 702. Since a rate of zero is by 
definition not "reimbursement," and since a rate of zero is not commensurate with the level of 
care, unless no care is given, once a state adopts the "inappropriate level of care" language 
fiom the relevant CFR, it is obligated to abide by it. Therefore, in these cases, the state must 
reimburse KMC in the event that either there were no other available facilities, but also in the 
event that the hospital chose to retain the patients even if alternative facilities were available. 
103 F.3d at 703.~ 
L. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ROLE ON APPEAL 
Beginning on page 27 of its Appellant's Brief on Appeal, IDHW argues that the 
4 Although Cook deals with the language of the now repealed Boren Amendment, the newly 
amended language relevant to the Cook analysis is the same. See Alaska Health and Social 
Services v. Medicare and Medicaid, 424 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2005). in Cook, the 
reimbursement was held to be mandatory under the language of the Boren Amendment. Now 
that the amendment has been repealed, the issue is controlled by 42 CFR 5 447.253, which 
makes participation the option of the state. IDAPA 16.03.09.400 indicates that Idaho has 
opted in to the set of regulations, and consequently Idaho is now bound by them. 
District Court erred in not remanding these cases back to the Department or its designee for 
further proceedings. Given the record and circumstances of this case, it should be apparent to 
this court that obtaining a "fair hearing" before the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
on this issue is a virtual impossibility. 
Further, as long as all of the relevant medical evidence and testimony is available at 
the "fair hearing" required by federal law, the applicant seeking review of a decision 
modifying or denying Medicaid coverage is entitled to a decision at the hearing. Remanding 
to a lower level is not an option, because when the sufficiency of the evidence is not in 
question, the applicant is entitled to a decision as a matter of right. 
Instructive as to these points is the case of Albert S. v. Dept. of Health, 166 Md. App. 
726 (2006). In Albert, the plaintiff was denied benefits on the initial review of his case by the 
state agency. The plaintiff then appealed, and received his "fair hearing" before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ). Instead of resolving the case on the merits, the ALJ 
remanded the case to the state agency because additional medical evidence had been 
presented at the "fair hearing." The wurt held that this was reversible error: "[once] an 
applicant contests the determination of the SRT ("State Reviewing Team"), it is the ALJ's 
responsibility to render a final decision in the matter." 166 Md. App. at 749, citing 42 CFR 5 
43 1.200(a), 43 1.220(a)(1), 43 1.244, and 43 1.245. 
In Bonner General Hospital v. Bonner County, 133 Idaho 7, 981 P.2d 242 (1999), 
Bonner County denied a claim for indigent medical assistance. The court found "that the 
commission's findings of fact [were] not supported by substantial and competent evidence and 
the decision to deny [the patient's] application was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of 
discretion." 113 Idaho at 11. The District Court, on appeal of the commissioners' decision, 
reversed the commissioners' decision outright. On appeal to the Supreme Court, citing I.C. 5 
67-5279 the County argued that the District Court erred by not remanding back to the 
commissioners to make further findings of fact. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, 
concluding: 
There is no indication in the record that further findings of fact 
could be made from the paucity of evidence that would affect 
the outcome of this case. Consequently, we hold that no 
remand by the district court was necessary. 
Id. 
In this case, although the Hearing Officer ultimately rejected most of the evidence 
presented by KMC as "irrelevant," it is clear that she is determined to follow the directives of 
the Department regardless of the requirements of federal law. Furthermore, the evidence is in 
the record, and was before the District Court. Inasmuch as the relevant and competent 
evidence leads to only one result, remand was neither necessary nor appropriate. Judge 
Mitchell's decision in that respect was correct and should be affirmed by this Court. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Idaho has, courtesy of regulations promulgated by its Department of Health and 
Welfare, a defective, arbitrary and capricious system of administrating disputed Medicaid 
claims. The denials of the claims at issue before this Court were patently arbitrary, based on 
the poorly articulated and frequently shifting justifications of a company that functions, at 
least in large part, to deny such claims. The Department substantially assisted that company 
in that task by promulgating regulations at odds with the organic federal law, giving the 
company essentially carte blanche to deny claims for whatever reasons it deemed fit 
Compounding that basic flaw in the system is yet another set of regulations, also 
promulgated by the Department, also in contravention of the relevant organic federal statutory 
and regulatory law, rendering it virtually certain that no aggrieved beneficiary or provider 
could ever prevail on a "fair hearing," save only in the circumstance that the Department or its 
paid designee unilaterally decided to reverse itself. 
The ruling of Judge Mitchell in these cases was correct on all counts. Respondent 
respectfully requests this court to affirm the ruling below 
SC? 
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